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RESEARCH & DEBATE
THE EFFECT OF TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES ON THE MARITIME
STRATEGY OF CHINA
Wang Wei
Translated by OS3 Danling Cacioppo, U.S. Navy
Weaponry and concepts (that is to say, combat theory, or more specifically, doc-
trine regarding the practical employment of some specific weapon) have en-
dured as themes of warfare throughout the history of mankind. From the
perspective of their development, there has always been an interactive relation-
ship between weaponry and combat theory. Lack of coordination in the devel-
opment of these two elements has led to a spiral in which one continually
supersedes the other. A weapon based on a completely new concept appears; it is
often not employed according to the commander’s original intentions, precipi-
tating a change in how it is used and a shift to alternative technological
improvements.
TENSION BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND
THE CHOICE OF DELIVERY PLATFORM
From the most fundamental point of view, every action on the battlefield can
be summed up as “the action and counteraction between capabilities—more
specifically, firepower—and information, between the opposing parties.” Un-
doubtedly, the birth of aviation weaponry and its massive use produced a revo-
lutionary impact on the patterns of modern warfare. The most prominent
manifestation of its “revolutionary” character is the fact that airpower pro-
vides commanders with a relatively easy method of penetrating physically the
enemy’s defensive system and delivering firepower—in abstract terms, of con-
ducting power projection.
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As aviation (and space) weaponry of all kinds developed, air-defense systems
evolved as well, from “barrage balloons” to surface-to-air missiles, from point
air defense to area air defense, all the way up to today’s out-of-area interception
technology. From a historical perspective, and in terms of the interaction be-
tween offensive and defensive systems, changes in “delivery methods” of fire-
power can be understood as simply the continuous evolution of the
cost-effectiveness ratio. During World War II, vast numbers of bombers, “Flying
Fortresses,” covered the sky over strategic nodes of the Axis powers. During the
Korean War, bombers confronted newly developed jet-propelled interceptor air-
craft, and the high cost-effectiveness of this mode of delivery became difficult to
sustain. Until the Vietnam War, the United States possessed absolute air superi-
ority; then, however, facing surface-to-air missiles, it often exchanged the mis-
sions of tactical aircraft and heavy bombers, employing F-105 fighter-bombers
to attack targets deep within enemy territory while relying on B-52 strategic
bombers for support missions on the battlefield and against forward positions.
During the Persian Gulf War, coalition strikes against deep targets were all un-
dertaken by tactical aircraft—for example, by the F-117A stealth fighter, which
carries only two laser-guided bombs. It is important to note that since the Ko-
rean War, the majority of wars involving great powers like the United States have
been of medium or low intensity, so their combat systems have been used in rela-
tively benign environments.
Cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, both of which appeared in the final
stage of World War II, possess even stronger capabilities than existing types of
tactical aircraft for penetration of the enemy’s defensive space, and at an even
better cost-effectiveness ratio. Ballistic missiles, given the same tactical param-
eters, offer more outstanding penetration capability and cost-effectiveness
than cruise missiles.
One of the reasons that numerous third-world countries favor tactical ballis-
tic missiles is that because of their limitations, they are generally at a significant
disadvantage in confrontations with great powers. Under such circumstances,
how to guarantee penetration of the enemy’s defense space is the first problem to
be solved. By means of ballistic missiles, an actor inferior in combat aircraft
can deliver firepower against a dominant actor. From the economic point of
view, developing an effective air force is very complex and requires a long ges-
tation period. A substantial deterrent using tactical ballistic missiles takes far
fewer resources; it is a “short-term investment” that can produce instant re-
sults. The effect is similar to that of crossbows against knights in medieval Eu-
rope—and today, as with the “Law Forbidding Crossbows,” developed Western
countries impose tight restrictions on tactical missiles and related technology.
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TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
LAND-BASED SEA CONTROL
Simply put, the emergence of tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) has enabled
weaker parties to offset to a certain extent the effectiveness of the expensive air
combat systems of stronger opponents at a relatively low cost. However, the
TBM alone cannot fundamentally change the superior and inferior positions of
the two sides. During the Persian Gulf War, coalition air forces flew more than
112,000 sorties, dropping 225,500 bombs; during the Kosovo war, NATO forces
flew thirty-five thousand sorties and dropped twenty-five thousand bombs;
during the war in Afghanistan, U.S., British, and other allied forces dropped a to-
tal of about 17,400 bombs. From the perspective of the cost-effectiveness ratio, it
is hard to imagine that TBMs could deliver firepower on the same scale. But the
weapon often makes a significant difference for the weak forces of a small coun-
try against the integrated combat systems of a great power.
At the tactical level, the value of medium- and short-range TBMs—presently
one of China’s principal means of delivering long-range firepower—lies in their
ability to penetrate enemy defense systems without placing high demands on the
tactical environment. When we broaden our discussion to encompass the strate-
gic level, however, the value of tactical missiles must be restated in this way: they
provide China with more maneuvering space for military and political strategic
operations on its eastern, maritime flank.
First, let us examine the Taiwan Strait. At the most comprehensive level,
China’s Taiwan strategy is at present one of building up reserves rather than
preparation. The core of this effort consists in strategic resource accumulation
and geopolitical positioning. The specific goals are to avoid a situation in which
the Taiwanese authorities go too far toward independence and to curtail gradu-
ally their political room for maneuver, thus laying the foundation for future
unification.
To maintain the current trend of stability in the strait area, it is necessary for
the central government to maintain a certain amount of military pressure
against separatist forces, in addition to various political and diplomatic mea-
sures, to deter behavior that “crosses the line or oversteps the boundary.” Thus,
TBMs offer the mainland strategy toward Taiwan a third option, aside from
all-out use of force or reliance on nonmilitary means. That third choice, “attack-
ing without entering,” represents a critical military way of exerting pressure on
Taiwan. It creates greater decision-making space for the mainland with respect
to Taiwan, while compressing the available space for the Taiwanese regime and
greatly reducing its options. Put more concretely, ballistic missiles provide the
tools by which a “quasi-war” scenario can be made feasible. First, the tactical
missile’s strong penetration capability can guarantee a high probability of
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success without a large-scale, high-intensity attack on the island itself, even
against a fairly intact air-defense system. After all, the effectiveness gap between
missile and antimissile technologies is much greater than that between aircraft
and air-defense technologies. With respect to long-range firepower, the two
sides of the Taiwan Strait are simply not comparable; the mainland occupies an
absolute and asymmetrically dominant position. Moreover, missiles essentially
preclude engagements between personnel, thus giving the mainland control of
military action as well as of corresponding political effects. An additional effect
comes into play on the political level. Over a long period of time, deployment of
medium- and short-range TBMs along the mainland coast has had a significant
psychological impact on the Taiwanese public. Variations in the number of mis-
siles deployed have become an indirect means of exerting influence upon the is-
land’s internal political situation.
In the longer term, should the mainland have no alternative but the use of
force in order to recover Taiwan, it will not be possible to neglect the possibility
of intervention by foreign militaries. Therefore, it will be necessary to undertake
strategic deployments in advance, in order to minimize the likelihood as well as
the intensity of any such intervention.
Unlike tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, or other such delivery platforms, bal-
listic missiles cannot be intercepted by the enemy’s air force. For an island na-
tion, such as Japan, the most practical method to increase the depth of defensive
space is deploying sea-based missile interceptor systems in coastal waters.
Against the threat of medium-range ballistic missiles from the Chinese main-
land, however, what is needed is not a few “Aegis” air-defense ships but a com-
plete naval combat system—just as China has developed a complete attack
system. The maneuver and deployment of tactical missiles on home territory
causes China few military or political problems, whereas, in addition to their re-
taliatory value, they pose a “clear and present threat” that keeps enemy naval de-
ployments in check.
From a broader, regional perspective, in fact, stabilization of the U.S.-Chinese
relationship depends to some extent on China’s deployment of long-range fire-
power, including TBMs. The three “island chains” form an important compo-
nent of U.S. national strategy in the western Pacific; they all serve to obstruct the
Chinese navy’s routes into the open ocean, thus restricting its scope of opera-
tions to a narrow area. From a purely military perspective, the ideal forward po-
sition of U.S. forces should be the “second island chain.” There they can avoid
direct contact with Chinese forces while relying on the superiority of U.S.
long-range striking power, thereby containing China more effectively. However,
it is quite obvious that the United States would not be able to pull back so far in
the short run—the Korean Peninsula, the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands, Taiwan,
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and other regions of the “first island chain” are all in very unsettled phases in
their histories. In the absence of any strategic breathing space, were the United
States rashly to withdraw its forces from these places, chaos would surely ensue,
and effective control might well be forfeited.
Having in mind the technological disparities in any potential Sino-American
conflict, China’s primary concern with regard to long-range firepower delivery
must be the penetration capability of its delivery platforms against U.S. defense
systems, not cost-benefit calculations. If one again considers grand strategy, war,
from China’s point of view, would be an unfortunate instrument of last resort,
not one by which China can pursue interests beyond its fundamental interests;
therefore China’s understanding of cost-effectiveness would not be the same as
that of the United States. For that reason, the TBM plays the important role it
does: as long as China possesses sufficient capability for long-range firepower
delivery, in any outbreak of hostilities between China and the United States the
TBM would make the American bases spread out along the first island chain
“chopping blocks” for China’s firepower and increase the costs to the United
States of a war enormously. U.S. war calculations are made according to “cost ac-
counting”; in reality, however, American forces based along the first island chain
have become unwilling hostages in the strategic chess match between China and
the United States.
The result is that for a very long time, in the western Pacific and even else-
where, China and the United States have significantly lowered the chances of
conflict, though they view each other with great anxiety. Also, in an era of peace,
the island-chains containment strategy has in fact little practical effect in im-
peding China’s development—and for China at the present stage, nothing is
more important than a stable environment for development.
FUNDAMENTALS OF TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE STRIKES
AGAINST SEA TARGETS
Reports to the effect that “the Chinese armed forces are exploring ballistic mis-
sile attacks against aircraft carriers” have surfaced time and again in the media.
Therefore, it is necessary to explain in simple terms the technical aspects of this
question. This article does not seek to prove or predict anything; the author
wishes only to discuss the feasibility of TBM attacks against moving targets on
the surface of the ocean, from a nonspecialist perspective.
Suppose ballistic missiles are flying toward a formation of surface ships (let
us tentatively defer the question of whether the missiles will hit or not). Also
suppose that in response the vessels attempt to intercept them. Beyond doubt,
the probability of successful interception, even if not zero, will certainly be far
less than it would be of intercepting either aircraft or cruise missiles, since, as
W A N G W E I 1 3 7
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stated previously, the ballistic missile has a greater penetration capability against
area-defense systems.
The next question is whether ballistic missiles are capable of hitting moving
surface ships. The current conventional wisdom, on the Internet and in other
media outlets, generally holds that as ballistic missiles were originally designed
to attack fixed targets on land, moving targets on water greatly increase the tech-
nical difficulties. But in reality, it is hard to make a straightforward comparison.
First, the maximum speed of current large or medium-sized surface ships is
around thirty knots. Compared to that of ballistic missiles, which travel at many
times the speed of sound, up to Mach 10 and beyond, the mobility of surface
ships is very limited. At least, ballistic missiles striking targets at sea seems more
reasonable than ground-based missile-defense systems intercepting incoming
missiles. As the latter have achieved some important milestones, it can be as-
sumed that developing ballistic missiles for deployment against targets at sea
would require merely reintegration of specific technologies, not a quantum leap
in the overall technological level.
Second, surface targets on water contrast more sharply against their back-
ground and are much easier to locate than targets in complex terrain or “hard
targets” underground. Finally, compared with ground-based weapon systems
that can be deployed in a dispersed arrangement, surface ships are highly inte-
grated platforms, and this means that their survivability in combat is lower.
Thus, while it is difficult to imagine one or two conventionally armed guided
missiles paralyzing an air base, the same firepower delivered against an aircraft
carrier could easily cost it the ability to launch and recover aircraft. Admittedly,
from a systems perspective, evaluating the cost-effectiveness of ballistic missiles
used against surface ships, if technology permits it, will not be so clear-cut.
From an engineering standpoint, the key to ballistic missile strikes against
targets at sea lies, in the author’s opinion, in the preparation of the maritime bat-
tlefield. That is to say, a prerequisite of attacks against mobile targets is solving
such problems as precise reconnaissance and positioning, data exchange, etc.
Preparation of the maritime battlefield will require marine surveillance satel-
lites, electronic reconnaissance satellites, imaging reconnaissance satellites,
communication satellites, and other space-based systems; airborne early warn-
ing aircraft, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and other airborne systems; and
shore-based over-the-horizon radars, underwater sonar arrays, and the like.
These systems must be viewed as a “public investment”—parts of a comprehen-
sive naval combat system.
Between the launch of a ballistic missile and impact, there is an interval dur-
ing which targeted vessels may attempt to escape. The flight of a ballistic missile
with a range of 1,500 kilometers, for example, takes eight to ten minutes; in that
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time a surface target, if its speed is thirty knots, can move about three nautical
miles. Therefore, to ensure that the ballistic missile hits its target, its trajectory
needs to be adjusted in flight. Certain ballistic missiles, such as the Russian SS-27
Topol-M, already employ various technologies to maneuver in space. These ma-
neuvers, however, are preprogrammed attempts to evade enemy interception;
they are not the type of course adjustment we are discussing here. However, ac-
cording to public reports, China’s “Shenzhou” spacecraft successfully carried
out orbital adjustments during its experimental flights. Therefore, we can as-
sume that for China there will be no technological bottlenecks in controlled ma-
neuvers for ballistic missiles in space.
Alternatively, midcourse-phase course-correction data can be fed to a missile
from an external source—what is known as command guidance. Or, the missile
can carry its own radar or other sensors to detect the target from high altitude
and provide trajectory-correction information.
Reentry-phase guidance, such as air rudders, microrocket motors, and other
terminal-phase guidance technologies, has been used since the “Pershing” mis-
sile developed during the Cold War era. TBMs currently in Chinese service also
use this kind of technology. Thus, it can be assumed that technical problems
with respect to the missile itself are not insurmountable. Moreover, it might be
possible, following reentry into the atmosphere, to reduce the speed of the war-
head in order to adjust its trajectory. Alternatively, multiple missiles may be em-
ployed in “precision firepower coverage” tactics against escape routes.
It is not the purpose of this article to solve engineering and technical prob-
lems. The above discussion is simply to make clear what follows, with regard to
naval combat systems—that a TBM maritime strike system will give the Chinese
military an asymmetrical means of firepower delivery in any future conflict at
sea. Developments in antimissile technology have reached such a point that bal-
listic missiles are no longer absolutely impossible to resist. But at the same time,
in any actual confrontation the unequal effectiveness of offensive and defensive
systems gives the ballistic missile an advantage. However, tactical ballistic mis-
siles cannot replace aircraft carriers, submarines, and other traditional naval
weapons. The major difference is like that between “special forces” and “regular
forces”—ballistic missiles can be used to destroy enemy forces at sea but not to
achieve absolute sea control, let alone to project maritime power.
Let us now return to the strategic level. The relative impacts of military sys-
tems on the outcome of a conflict generally become more obvious as the conflict
intensifies. Employing the J-7 aircraft or even the J-6 to counter F-14s and
FA-18s may not be a problem during peacetime, but in a life-or-death situation,
the qualitative discrepancies could bring disastrous consequences. If a TBM
combat system comes into existence, it will establish for China in any
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This article was originally published as 王伟 [Wang Wei], “战术弹道导弹对中国海洋战略体系的
影响” [The Effect of Tactical Ballistic Missiles on the Maritime Strategy System of China], 舰载武
器 [Shipborne Weapons], no. 84 (August 2006), pp. 12–15.
high-intensity confl ict in its coastal waters an asymmetry, in its favor, in the deliv-
ery of fi repower and so will remedy to some extent China’s qualitative inferiority 
in traditional naval platforms. Further, the existence of this asymmetry would set 
up for both sides a psychological “upper limit” on the scale of confl ict. This would 
enable both parties to return more easily “to rationality,” thereby creating more 
space for maneuver in the resolution of maritime confl icts.
TRANSLATOR’S NOTE
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